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In their text, Pedro Lains and Jaime Reis raise some doubts about the progress 
made by our 1989 estimates of Portuguese gross domestic product, finding it hard 
to agree that they are more accurate than previous estimates. They argue that the 
methodology we used is shaky and that important parts of the picture we drew 
about Portuguese economic growth are unplausible. 
In our 1989 paper, it was acknowledged that our estimates are fully meaningful 
only in the long run, and that to use them in formal counter-factual analysis together 
with foreign trade and public finance data leads to circularity. Furthermore, we 
stated as one of our main conclusions that additional work (such as "A evolução da 
agricultura e da indústria em Portugal 1850-1913. Interpretação quantitativa" by 
Pedro Lains - Banco de Portugal, 1990; hereafter Lains, 1990) was needed. This 
obviously means we share many of the doubts expressed by Pedro Lains and Jaime 
Reis. 
However, we do not believe previous estimates to be better than ours, because 
we have designed a methodology tested to produce good estimates for the period 
for which we have reliable official data about gross domestic product; and we think 
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our description of Portuguese economic evolution is quite plausible, because it 
agrees with a lot of other qualitative and quantitative evidence. 
As far as methodological questions are concerned, let us only add two remarks. 
First, gross domestic product was not "estimated by means of a weighted 
average of proxy variables", implying some stability in the ratios of these proxy 
variables to gross domestic product. As a matter of fact, our approach allows for 
increasing weights of foreign relations and of public finance in economic life (for 
instance, the export/GDP ratio implicit in our figures varies between 3% and 26%, 
and the import/GDP, fiscal receipts/GDP and public expenditure/GDP ratios show 
even higher increases in the long run). According to Pedro Lains and Jaime Reis, 
international comparisons suggest our method "systematically overestimates GDP", 
prior to the First World War. Of course, they may be right, and a downward revision 
of absolute figures of gross domestic product for the XlXth and early XXth centuries 
may be needed, but it should be stressed that such a revision would lead to higher 
values for foreign relations and government finance weights in economic life for the-
se years, and to lower increases of these weights in the long run. 
Second, we decided not to use money supply as a proxy variable for gross 
domestic product because we were convinced from qualitative evidence that sight 
deposits were not generally used as means of payments until the early XXth century, 
and gradually became usual means of payments during the first half of the XXth 
century. This means money supply should be equated with currency for the XlXth 
century, with currency plus a gradually rising proportion of sight deposits during the 
first half of the XXth century, and with currency plus sight deposits for the second 
half of the XXth century, for the purpose of gross domestic product estimation. We 
thought we had better avoid such a complex computation. No problem of this kind 
arises with the other proxy variables. 
Let us now turn to the description of Portuguese economic evolution. Pedro Lains 
and Jaime Reis think we exaggerated the contrast between a period of important 
growth in the 1870s and 1880s and a period of slowdown between 1890 and the 
First World War, find our picture of the breakdown of the Portuguese economy 
during the First World War too catastrophic, doubt there was such a good economic 
performance in the interwar years, and come back to the traditional view of the 
Second World War as a "period of global prosperity for Portuguese economy". Such 
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opinions are based on quantitative evidence presented mainly in Lains, 1990 and 
in their text, and on qualitative informations of various kinds. 
It is impossible to present here a critical review of Lains, 1990 and of the data 
presented in Pedro Lains' and Jaime Reis'text, because it would take too much 
space. Anyway, let us point out that those estimates of output indexes are mainly 
based on proxy variables and seem to be as volatile as our estimates of gross 
domestic product. This means they are the best available information about 
physical production, and that we agree they may cast some doubts about our 
estimates. However, we think they cannot be accepted as decisive tests against our 
figures. 
With regard to the pre-First World War period, the contrast between the 
perspective of Pedro Lains' and Jaime Reis' and ours is mainly a consequence of 
Pedro Lains' estimate of the growth of agricultural output during the 1890's. As a 
matter of fact, for the period of the 1870s and 1880s, we find the 1.3% increase 
per year in agricultural output and the 2.7% increase per year in industrial output 
depicted in Lains, 1990 quite compatible with the 2.1% increase per year in gross 
domestic product depicted in our estimate, because the increase in the service 
sector must have been important in a period of intensive railway building in the 
country; and figures for the early XXth century (before the First World War) years are 
not contradictory in either estimate (a decrease of 0.5% per year in agricultural 
output and an increase of 2.5% per year in industrial output. according to Lains' 
1990, and an increase of 0.4% per year in gross domestic product according to our 
estimate). 
The 2.0% increase per year in agricultural output between 1890 and 1900 is one 
of the most puzzling elements of Lains, 1990, specially when it is compared with 
the drop between 1900 and 1913. These ups and down are difficult to reconcile 
with the statement that "the protectionist measures of 1889 and 1899 fostered 
(agricultural) growth as they were intended to do". As a matter of fact, protectionist 
backgrounds for agriculture, as prior to 1865 and after 1889, seem to be 
detrimental to agricultural (and overall) growth (though beneficial to the growth of 
the cereals subsector studied by Jaime Reis in "A Lei da Fome: as origens do 
proteccionismo cerealífero (1889-1914)" - Instituto Gulbenkian de Ciência, 1979); 
while free-trade backgrounds for agriculture, as between 1865 and 1889, seem to 
be beneficial to agricultural (and overall) growth (though detrimental to the growth 
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of the cereals subsector, as the indexes, Lains, 1990 also show). This should not be 
a surprise, given the relative inefficiency of cereal production in Portugal as against 
the rest of Portuguese agriculture, and as against foreign cereal production. 
This leads us to think a less spectacular boom of agricultural output is much 
more likely for the 1890s. Such a downward revision of the figure for agriculture 
would bring the overall rate of growth more in line with our 1.6% increase per year 
in the gross domestic product estimate. This also allows us to avoid the task of 
finding an explanation for the stimulating effects of the 1891 financial crisis and of 
its consequences (depreciated currency, state bankruptcy, and increased 
protectionism) in a small economy. 
With regard to the First World War period, it is only fair to acknowledge that the 
sharp decline in the standards of living depicted by our estimates is most likely 
exaggerated, because the rural world must have fared better than statistics reveal. 
However, it is hard to believe in the stagnation of output suggested by Pedro Lains 
and Jaime Reis in a country whose industry was heavily dependent on foreign 
supplies and markets as the very methodology of Pedro Lains' and Jaime Reis' 
industrial output index shows. Of course, the relevant comparison should not be 
made with the industrialized European belligerents, but with European belligerents 
with a level of development similar to Portugal. Furthermore, we do not accept the 
argument that "the fabric of society and the institutional framework [...] survived", 
because we find eight revolutions, one period of civil war, two general strikes, and 
some minor agitation, quite a lot for the years 1915 to 1921, even if the final result 
was neither socialism, nor dictatorship, but a liberal republican regime similar to the 
prewar one. Anyway, this is, of course, quite subjective. 
The evaluation of the interwar period depends crucially on the evaluation of the 
First World War years. As a matter of fact, the 2.4% increase per year in agricultural 
output in the 1919-1938 period, and the 5.1% increase per year in industrial output 
in the same period assumed in Pedro Lains' and Jaime Reis' text combined with the 
stagnation they suggest for the First World War years, would almost certainly lead to 
a 1913-1938 growth even higher than the 2.2% increase per year in gross domestic 
product in the period 1913-1938 of our estimate. In these circumstances, there is 
no need of further elaboration about these years. 
With regard to the Second World War years, Pedro Lains' and Jaime Reis' 
traditional view rests mainly on the official estimates of gross domestic product for 
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the years 1938 and 1947 in the continental part of the country. We rejected 1938 
figures as inaccurate, and we replaced the 2.7% increase per year shown in official 
figures by a mere 1.2% increase per year. However, the crucial point is not if there 
was growth between 1938 and 1947 (there certainly was), but if the growth was 
concentrated in the years 1938-1941 and 1945-1947 (as we believe), or evenly 
spread throughout the decade (as Pedro Lains and Jaime Reis believe). This must 
remain an unsettled question, because the quantitative evidence does not allow 
accurate year-to-year estimates, but we think that the view of the Second World War 
as a period of brilliant prosperity is too influenced by the performance of tungsten 
exports and of remittances to refugees, and does not pay enough attention to the 
bad weather conditions of some years or to the effects of supply shortages. 
Let us conclude by expressing our satisfaction with the contribution Pedro Lains 
and Jaime Reis provided for the debate on Portuguese economic growth and our 
hope that this debate will widen and improve in accuracy during the next years. 
 
 
